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Abstract―42” SNP-BEM is the biggest buried gas export 
pipeline belong to PT XYZ and has been operated joinly with 
PT POMA for duration of 20 years. Until today, this pipe has 
survived very well from the worst potential failure or risk events 
such as rupture and leak since all strategic of maintenances are 
considered as sufficient facing the sources of risk agent, despite 
still different perceptions are presence among the operators in 
real application. Nevertheless, following the operation versus 
times, there is an increasing of potential external threat or risk 
agents due to the growth of housing, the overlapped operational 
permit of industrial of non-oil/gas, illegal road crossing which 
may cause the occurrence of risk events/failures. In 2016, there 
was a critical incident of the soil movement caused by the 
excessive load of coal’s stock pile nearby ROW and impacted to 
the pipe movement about 6 meters in horizontal and 2 meters in 
vertical and may lead to disastrous. Therefore, a more effective 
maintenance strategy is to be developed to reduce these risks. 
Combination of Fish Bone diagram (FBD) and House of Risk 
(HOR) is selected to identify the sources of risk and to develop 
more effective risk-based maintenance strategy. Based on the 
assessment, it is identified (twelve) 12 credible risk agents which 
contributing to pipeline failures/risk events and (eight) 8 
proposed preventive actions to reduce the risk. These proposed 
actions shall be agreed by all operators as a reference for 
developing risk-based maintenance strategy. 
 
Keywords―Pipeline, Maintenance, Risk Event, Risk Agent, 
Preventive Action. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N PT XYZ, 42” gas export from SNP-BEM is the biggest 
pipeline among the other 2 export lines, 32” CPU-BEM & 
32” NPU-BEM.  The total gas transporting through this line 
about 600 MMSCFD (Millions Standard Cubic Feet per day). 
This is equal to around 600,000 MMBtu/d (Millions British 
Thermal Unit/d), where the selling gas price about 
5$/MMBtu (July 2020), therefore the stake production on this 
line is about 3M$/d. This huge amount of money is 
contributing to the development of Republic of Indonesian. 
Therefore, this line is playing very important role and should 
be carefully operated and maintained to ensure its integrity & 
reliability. 
This line is designed with maximum pressure of 90 barg, 
at temperature of 55-60oC. It has very long span from SNP to 
BEM about 82 km length, buried below soil surface at 2mtr 
depth, across different type of terrain from rural onshore, 
swampy, river crossing and some road crossings with very 
dense population and industrial growth at current condition. 
When it was built in 1998, the surrounding area was quite 
empty and in accordance to ASME 31.8, the pipeline was 
classified as class 1, division 2. It means that the number of 
buildings within 1.6 km length and 300 mts spans of line was 
below 10 houses with design factor below 0.72. The lines 
should be able to operate for duration of 30 years design life, 
meaning that by design it should be finished by 2028.  
Following the government policy, there is also a scheme of 
FSA (Facility Sharing Agreement) that required sharing 
operation with the other oil & gas operators from UAE & 
Italy. This scheme will reduce CAPEX so that reducing 
government financial expenditure at the end. This line is also 
operated together with other oil & gas companies from USA 
as back up line in the case of any plant up set in their facilities 
occurred. This sharing operation activity is called as POMA 
(Pipeline Operation & Maintenance Agreement). This 
agreement is posing a potential problem since they have 
different approach & methodology to handle the operation.  
To ensure integrity & reliability of the line so that it can be 
operated at least up to design life, the Pipeline Management 
System has been implemented since beginning of the 
operation. Nevertheless, at site operational level, the 
implementation is very challenging to make it happened, due 
to some reasons such as: 
1. Subjectivity of the decision makers involved because 
different methodology is being used of each operator,  
2. Different responsibility of each operator for the same line  
3. The growth of non-oil and gas industrial along row 
corridor (coal mining, plantation, cement, etc)  
4. The population growth causing exponentially housing 
construction 
5. Current low oil price & epidemic covid19 case leading to 
very tight budget operation (opex).  
Therefore, the appropriate approach should be defined to 
solve the above challenges. Typical of 42” SNP-BEM aerial 
view & battery limit of operatorship between PHM & POMA 
indicated as Figure 1, where from SNP to RC#16 (Dondang) 
is under PT XZY scope, while downstream RC#16 up to 
BEM is under POMA scope. 
There was a similar experience in previous research for 
pipeline system using the same approach of HOR. Suhartono 
(2016) mentioned in his research that the risk of the oil 
pipeline is assumed inherent to all section of the line, which 
in actual condition he risk may be differs. He focused on the 
probability of failure due to time dependent threat 
(corrosion), referring only the result of In Line Inspection 
(ILI or Intelligent Pigging), which in writer opinion, this 
threat is supposed to be more controllable. He didn’t consider 
the actual situation along the pipeline operation which are 
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having also a lot of threats due to industrial, population, 
housing growth which can generated time independent threat 
and become more uncontrollable if it is not managed very 
well.    
Other researches were also refered, Prasanta Kumar Dey et 
al (2015), in this study they developed a risk-based 
maintenance model using a combined multiple-criteria 
decision-making and weight method (AHP – Anaylitical 
Hierarchy Process) for offshore oil and gas pipelines in 
Thailand. The proposed model helps the pipelines operators 
to analyze the health of pipelines dynamically, to select 
specific inspection and maintenance method for specific 
section in line with its probability and severity of failure. 
However, the opinion of SME (Subject Matter Experts) to 
provide the feedback is very subjective since they are solely 
based on their competency & knowledge on specific site 
location. Furthermore, there is no specific rule of thumb to be 
followed in the words to define the appropriate methodology, 
since the site condition is varied and shall be subject to each 
pipeline operators. 
The research objective will therefore to consider all 
credible threats either time dependent (internal) and non-time 
dependent (external), with following detail: 
1. To identify the potential pipeline failures (risk events) & 
the souce of risks (risk agent).  
2. To define the most credible risks to pipeline failures 
3. To develop appropriate strategy of pipeline inspection & 
maintenance for 42” SNP-BEM. 
 
Figure 1. (a) Battery Limit of Pipeline Maintenance, (b) Anomaly Finding on ROW Survey 2019. 
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II. PROPOSED FRAME WORK OF HOR (HOUSE OF 
RISK) 
The combination House of Risk (HOR) and of Fish Bone 
Diagram (FBD) is proposed in this study, FBD is used to 
determine the root cause among possible causes of the main 
problems. While HOR is used for developing strategy for 
maintenance by identifying the prevention factors in reducing 
the probability of failure risk (POF), as well as consequence 
of failure (COF) due to pipeline failures. 
A. Fish Bone Diagram (FBD) 
Fish Bone Diagram (FBD) is initially introduced by Kaoru 
Ishikawa (1960), who pioneered quality management 
processes in Kawasaki Shipyard, and in the process became 
one of the founding fathers of modern management. This 
FBD is also knowns as Ishikawa diagrams. The defect/risk 
events is shown as the fish's head, facing to the right, with the 
source of causes (risk agent) extending to the left as 
fishbones; the ribs branch off the backbone for major causes, 
with sub-branches for root-causes, to as many levels as 
required.  
The fish bone on the left side is then to be categorized into 
2 major threats: time dependent and non-time dependent. 
With refer to literatures & historical data, the time dependent 
threat is consisting of corrosion & overstress, while non time 
dependent threat is consisting of external activities, 
operational issues, construction & geohazard, as described in 
this Figure 2. 
Following this assessment, finally it found 19 sources of 
risk agents & 5 risk events. The risk agents are coded as A1-
A19, while Risk Events are coded with E1-E5. The table of 
risk agent & risk event can be found in this Table 1.  
Table 1. 
Nineteen (19) Sources of Risk Agent (A1-A19) 




the deterioration of a material, usually 
a metal, that results from an 
electrochemical reaction with its 




Welding defect during pipe 
manufacturing normally to the ERW 
(Electric Resistance welding) type 
A2 Internal Corrosion 
the deterioration of a material, usually 
a metal, that results from an 
electrochemical reaction with its 









a form of environmental attack of the 
metal involving an interaction of a 
local corrosive environment and tensile 
stresses in the metal, 





Metal defect during pipe manufacturing, 





Typical defect as A3 above, however 
with the presence of hydrogen induced 




Defect which may occurred in the flange 
to flange joint connection 
A5 Fatigue 
fatigue-type cracking of metal caused 





Soil erosion which caused by 
insufficient water management along 




The act of certain party by intention to 






Soil movement could be due to natural 
act or industrial act. 
A7 
Company   
Activity 
The repair/maintenance activities 
performed  by company which may 
lead to disturbance of pipeline system 
A16 Earthquake 
Natural act which may lead to massive 





The repair/maintenance activities 
performed by contractor which may 
lead to disturbance of pipeline system 
A17 Fire 
the event where bush or other flammable 
product along ROW is burn either by 




The act of certain parties beyond 
company control which not done by 





Malfunctional of the safety system 
(GOV - Gas Operated valve, MOV – 
Manual Operation Valve, ESDV – 
Emergency Shut Down Valve) 
   A19 Improper Operation 
The act of process pipeline operation 
beyond the SOP 
 
Table 2. 





1 Leak E1 
An unintentional escape of gas from the pipeline, the source of the leak may be holes, cracks (including propagating and 
non-propagating, longitudinal, and circumferential), separation or pull-out and loose connections. 
2 Rupture E2 
A complete failure of any portion of the pipeline 
that allows the product to escape to the environment. 
3 Buckle E3 
Condition in which the pipeline has undergone sufficient plastic deformation to cause permanent wrinkling in the pipe 
wall or excessive cross-sectional deformation caused by bending, axial, impact, and/or torsional loads acting alone or in 
combination with hydrostatic pressure. 
4 Dent E4 
A permanent deformation of the circular cross section 
of the pipe that produces a decrease in the diameter and is concave inward. 
5 Wrinkle E5 
Pipe bend produced by a field machine or controlled process which may result in prominent contour discontinuities on 




B. House Of Risk (HOR) 
The model is based on the notion that a proactive Supply 
Chain risk management should attempt to focus on preventive 
actions, i.e. reducing the probability of risk agents to occur. 
Reducing occurrence of the risk agents would typically 
prevent some of the risk events to occur. In such a case, it is 
necessary to identify the risk events and the associated risk 
agents. Typically, one risk agent could induce more than one 
risk events. For example, problems in a supplier production 
system could result in shortage of materials and increased 
reject rate where the latter is due to switching procurement to 
other, less capable, suppliers. The typical process of HOR 
model can be drawn in Figure 3. 
In the well-known FMEA, risk assessment is done through 
calculation of a RPN as a product of three factors, i.e. 
probability of occurrence, severity of impacts, and detection. 
Unlike in the FMEA model where both the probability of 
occurrence and the degree of severity are associated with the 
risk events, here we assign the probability to the risk agent 
and the severity to the risk event. Since one risk agent could 
induce a number of risk events, it is necessary to quantity the 
aggregate risk potential of a risk agent. If “Oj” is the 
probability of occurrence of risk agent “j”, “Si” is the severity 
of impact if risk event “i” occurred, and “Rij” is the 
correlation between risk agent “j” and risk event “i” (which 
is interpreted as how likely risk agent j would induce risk 
event “i") then the “ARPj” (aggregate risk potential of risk 
agent “j” ) can be calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑗 = 𝑂𝑗 ∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝑖
 (1) 
The HOQ (House of Quality) model is used to determine 
which risk agents should be given as the priority for 
preventive actions. A rank is assigned to each risk agent based 
on the magnitude of the ARPj values for each j. Hence, if 
there are many risk agents, the  proposed methodology is to 
select  a few of those considered having large potentials to 
induce risk events. In this paper, we propose two deployment 
models, called HOR, both of which are based on the modified 
HOQ: (1) HOR1 is used to determine which risk agents are 
to be given priority for preventive actions; (2) HOR2 is to 
give priority to those actions considered effective but with 
reasonable money and resource commitments. 
1) HOR 1 
In the HOQ model, we relate a set of requirements (what) 
and a set of responses (how) where each response could 
address one or more requirements. The degree of correlation 
is typically classified as none (and given an equivalent value 
of 0), low (one), moderate (three), and high (nine). Each 
requirement has a certain gap to fill and each response would 
require some types of resources and funds. Adopting the 
above procedure, the HOR1 is developed through the 
following steps: 
1. Identify risk events that could happen in each business 
process. This can be done through mapping SC processes 
(such as plan, source, deliver, make, and return) and then 
identify “what can go wrong” in each of those processes. 
Ackermann et al. (2007) provide a systematic way of 
identifying and assessing risks. In HOR1 model shown in 
this Table 2-8, the risk events are put in the left column, 
represented as Ei. 
2. Assess the impact (severity) of such risk event (if 
happened). We use a 1-10 scale where 10 represents 
extremely severe or catastrophic impact (see Shahin 
(2004) for a detailed verbal description about the 
scale).The severity of each risk event is put in the right 
column of Table 1, indicated as Si. 
3. Identify risk agents and assess the likelihood of 
occurrence of each risk agent. Here, a scale of 1-10 is also 
applied where 1 means almost never occurred and a value 
of 10means almost certain to happen.The risk agents (Aj) 
are placed on top row of the table and the associated 
occurrence is on the bottom row, notated as Oj. 
4. Develop a relationship matrix, i.e. relationship between 
each risk agent and each risk event, Rij {0, 1, 3, 9} where 
0 represents no correlation and 1, 3, and 9 represent, 
respectively, low, moderate, and high correlations. 
5. Calculate the aggregate risk potential of agent j (ARPj) 










Figure 3. HOR Modelling Processes. 
 
 
occurrence of the risk agent j and the aggregate impacts 
generated by the risk events caused by the risk agent j as 
in equation (1). 
6. Rank risk agents according to their aggregate risk 
potentials in a descending order (from large to low 
values).  
2) HOR 2 
HOR2 is used to determine which actions are to be done 
first, considering their differing effectiveness as well as 
resources involved and the degree of difficulties in 
performing. The company should ideally select set of actions 
that are not so difficult to perform but could effectively 
reduce the probability of risk agents occurring. The steps are 
as follows: 
a. Select a number of risk agents with high-priority rank, 
possibly using Pareto analysis of the ARPj, to be dealt 
with in the second HOR. Those selected will be placed in 
the left side (what) of HOR2 as depicted in Table 2. Put 
the corresponding ARPj values in the right column. 
b. Identify actions considered relevant for preventing the 
risk agents. Note that one risk agent could be tackled with 
more than one actions and one action could 
simultaneously reduce the likelihood of occurrence of 
more than one risk agent. The actions are put on the top 
row as the “How” for this HOR in Table 4. 
c. Determine the relationship between each preventive 
action and each risk agent, Ejk. The values could be {0, 1, 
3, 9} which represents, respectively, no, low, moderate, 
and high relationships between action k and agent j. This 
Table 5. 

























































































































































































































































































RISK EVENTS (Ei) A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19
Leak E1 9 9 9 9 9 9 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 3 9 3 1 3 3 5 S 1
Rupture  E2 3 3 9 9 9 9 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 9 9 9 3 3 6 S 2
Buckle  E3 0 0 0 0 3 9 1 9 9 0 1 1 1 3 9 9 1 3 9 3 S 3
Dent  E4 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 9 9 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 3 S 4
Wrinkle  E5 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 9 9 9 3 3 3 S 5
OCCURRENCE OF AGENT Oj 6 4 3 3 4 3 3 5 6 3 3 3 3 6 5 1 4 2 2
AGGREGATE RISK POTENTIALS ARPj 378 252 297 297 468 486 144 900 972 324 333 333 333 288 810 123 356 102 138
RANK OF PRIORITY R 6 15 12 13 5 4 16 2 1 11 8 9 10 14 3 18 7 19 17

























Thrid Partv Activity ARP 9 972 972 13% P1
Contracror Activitv ARP 8 900 1872 25% P2
Slop Movement/Land Slide ARP 15 810 2682 36% P3
Vandalism/Sabotage ARP 6 486 3168 43% P4
Fatique ARP 5 486 3654 50% P5
Evternal Corrosion ARP 1 378 4032 55% P6
Fire ARP 17 356 4388 60% P7
Defective Girth veld ARP 11 333 4721 64% P8
Defective Pipe Bodv ARP 12 333 5054 69% P9
Defective Other Joint ARP 13 333 5387 73% P10
Defective Long Seam veld ARP 10 324 5711 78% P11
Stress Corrosion Cracking ARP 3 297 6008 82% P12
Hvdrogen-assisted Craking ARP 4 297 6305 86% P13
Land vash-Out Erosion ARP 14 288 6593 90% P14
Internal Corrosion ARP 2 252 6845 93% P15
Companv Activitv ARP 7 144 6989 95% P16
Improper Operation ARP 19 138 7127 97% P17
Earthquake ARP 16 123 7250 99% P18







relationship (Ejk) could be considered as the degree of 
effectiveness of action k in reducing the likelihood of 
occurrence of risk agent Oj. 
d. Calculate the total effectiveness of each action as follows: 
𝑇𝐸𝑘 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑗𝐸𝑗𝑘       ∀𝓀
𝑗
 (2) 
e. Assess the degree of difficulties in performing each 
action, Dk, and put those values in a row below the total 
effectiveness. The degree of difficulties, which can be 
represented by a scale (such as Likert or other scale), 
should reflect the fund and other resources needed in 
doing the action. 
f. Calculate the total effectiveness to difficulty ratio, i.e. 
ETDk ¼ TEk=Dk. 
g. Assign rank of priority to each action (Rk) where Rank 1 
is given to the action with the highest ETDk. 
III. ADOPTING OF HOR IN DEVELOPING RISK 
BASED MAINTENANCE STRATEGY OF EXPORT GAS 
PIPELINE 
Following the result FBD assessment, the questionaire as 
described in Table 2 and 3 are to be prepared & sent to 
respondent for further comment. The selected respondents are 
taken within company’s SME (Subject Matter Experts) from 
the entities of safety, operation, project and inspection. They 
are requested to provide their opinion in term of severity & 
its correlation. The other questionaires in regard the proposed 
preventive actions are also given to respondent to know the 
correlation with the risk agents & its difficulty level for 
further site implementation. 
Further to these questioanires, the qualified data is 
obtained based on the modus approach, then to be discussed 
Table 7. 




The 8 most Effective Preventive Action 
 
RISK AGENTS  (Aj ) PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 PA6 PA7 PA8 PA9 PA10 PA11 PA12 PA13 PA14 PA15 PA16 PA17 PA18 PA19 ARPj
Thrid Partv Activity A9 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 1134
Contracror Activitv A8 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 9 900
Slop Movement/Land Slide A15 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 9 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 810
Vandalism/Sabotage A6 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 3 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 1 486
Fatique A5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 0 9 0 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 486
Evternal Corrosion A1 0 9 9 9 0 3 3 9 0 9 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 378
Fire A17 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 356
Defective Girth veld A11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 1 333
Defective Pipe Bodv A12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 1 333
Defective Other Joint A13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 333
Defective Long Seam veld A10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 324
Stress Corrosion Cracking A3 9 3 9 9 9 0 0 3 9 3 0 0 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 297
Total Effectiviness of Action k TEk 2673 4293 6075 6075 2673 34308 12192 24693 7047 4293 20724 7290 7047 17109 0 0 20484 25884 23328
Degree of Difficulty Performing 
Action k
Dk 2 3 2 4 3 2 3 3 2 4 3 2 3 4 3 1 2 2 2
Effectiveness to Difficulty Ratio of 
Action k
ETDk 1337 1431 3038 1519 891 17154 4064 8231 3524 1073 6908 3645 2349 4277 0 0 10242 12942 11664





PA6 17154 17154 18% P1
PA18 12942 30096 32% P2
PA19 11664 41760 44% P3
PA17 10242 52002 55% P4
PA8 8231 60233 64% P5
PA11 6908 67141 71% P6
PA14 4277 71418 76% P7
PA7 4064 75482 80% P8
PA12 3645 79127 84% P9
PA9 3524 82651 88% P10
PA3 3038 85688 91% P11
PA13 2349 88037 93% P12
PA4 1519 89556 95% P13
PA2 1431 90987 96% P14
PA1 1337 92324 98% P15
PA10 1073 93397 99% P16
PA5 891 94288 100% P17
PA15 0 94288 100% P18
PA16 0 94288 100% P19
TOTAL 94288
PREVENTIVE ACTION
To put sandbag support at free span cases 
To perform maintenance & reading of CP Potential regularly at test point
Regular monitoring & to put additional pipe support to minimize vibration. 
To perform pipeline liquid coating refurbishment
To perform regular ROW patrol     
To perform regular education & socialization to all stakes along ROW, i.e. 
vilagers, industrial, and government.
To perform regular review & update of the existing SOP & operating guidelines.
To perform monitoring & maintain regularly all Markers (ROW, Pipe), 
Reinstate the pipe should any exposed due to erosion, landslide or other causes.
P3
To put appropriate protection at road crossing area
To Cut & Replace, or to put sleeve the corroded section at wall thickness below 
To perform Vegetation Clearing regularly
To install geotextile & repair of the affected soil eroded area. 
P1
P2
To perform composite refurbishment should any heavy corrosion external. 
To perform cleaning pigging regularly to ensure line cleanliness 
To maintain pig barrels & isolation valves regularly 
To perform regularly function test of safety system ( ESDV, SDV, PSHH, PSLL 
To perform adjustment of current & voltage at CPTR regularly and to provide 
additional sacrificial anodes should the protection level is below the 
requirements. 
Continuously Inject Corrosion Inhibitors to the lines
 
 
in the FGD (Forum Group Discussion) attended by the SMEs 
to get the final validation. 
From HOR 1, the calculation of ARP (Aggregate Risk 
Potential)  is to be performed as Table 5 and using the Pareto 
approach, it is found that the first 80% of cummulative score 
to be considered as P1 (Priority 1) with 12 most credible 
source of risk agents, as presented on Table 6. 
While the result of HOR 2 evaluation, following the 
calculation of Total Effectiveness (TE) in Table 7, finally it 
is found the (eight) 8 most effective preventive action as 
presented in Table 8 also using typical prioritization approach 
of Pareto. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Based on the assessment result in previous chapter, it can 
be concluded that: (a) (Five) 5 risk events have been 
identified as potential failure to the pipeline, with the highest 
severity governed by Rupture then followed by leak and 19 
risk agents have been identified from FBD assessment, which 
consist of 2 major threats, namely time dependent threat with 
5 sources of risk agent and non-time dependent threat with 14 
risk agents; (b) Following assessment of HOR1 (ARP – 
Aggregate Risk Potential), (twelve) 12 risk agents have been 
defined as credible risk to the failure of export gas pipeline 
42” SNP-BEM, using pareto approach; (c) Based on HOR 2 
assessment (Effectiveness to Difficulty Ratio), finaly, (eight) 
8 preventive actions will be taken as first priority for the 
proposed maintenance strategy of 42” SNP-BEM export gas 
pipeline, with the difficulty level within relatively low to 
medium level from 2 (easy) to 3 (difficult).  Some actions will 
be done in straight forward, such as the first 4 preventive 
actions, whiles the rest shall be discussed with the authority 
since some permits & budget approval to be obtained. 
And recommendations: (a) After performing the research, 
it is recommended to  apply FBD & HOR methodology in 
maintenance priority to other pipelines within PT XYZ; (b) 
The proposed preventive actions shall be communicated & to 
be agreed by other pipeline operators (POMA) to get the same 
perception and understanding during site implementation; (c) 
This thesis scope is not considering detail cost impact and 
resources limitation. 
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